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Abstract—The use of sensor networks has increased rapidly
over the last years. Due to their low resources, sensors come
along with new issues regarding network security and energy
consumption.
Focusing on the network availability, previous studies proposed
to protect the network against denial of service attacks with
the use of traffic monitoring agents on some nodes. But if
the control nodes go down or get compromised, they leave the
network unprotected. To better fight against attacks, we try
to enhance this solution by introducing an energy-aware and
secure method to select these monitoring nodes (called cNodes)
in a clustered wireless sensor network. Our election process is
done in accordance to their remaining reserves: nodes with the
higher residual energy are selected. We discuss limitations of this
deterministic process concerning security and cluster coverage,
and suggest as a workaround to designate new control nodes
(called vNodes). Those vNodes are responsible for monitoring the
cNodes by periodically enquiring about their remaining energy
and ensuring that they do not lie during the election process
(in attempt to keep their cNode role). Finally, we present some
experimental results obtained with the ns-3 simulator in order
to analyze the impact of our proposal on the energy repartition
in the network.
Index Terms—Wireless sensor networks; Reliability, availabil-
ity, and serviceability; Energy-aware systems; Simulation
INTRODUCTION
Traffic regulation or pollution measurement in water are
example activities which require the constant presence of mea-
suring agents over wide — and sometimes hard to access —
areas. In such cases, as it is not feasible to send people on site
to run measurements, wireless sensor networks are used. They
are made of small devices, sometimes dropped on the spot by
helicopter, tasked with gathering data on their physical envi-
ronment. Sensors are able to exchange data through wireless
communications. Useful data is typically centralized by a base
station, which acts as an interface between the network and
the user.
As they are often used in hostile environments with no
human assistance, sensors are generally able to self-organize
and to form a consistent network. But they also embed cheap
hardware, as it may be hard, if possible at all, to fetch them
once their life cycle is over. Consequently, they have restricted
resources: low computational capabilities and low available
memory. They also have limited energy [1] in a single-use
battery.
Wireless sensor networks are used for many applications
[2], [3], some of them being crucial. For instance there is
a lot at stakes when sensor networks are used for watching
forests for fires, for measuring the nuclear activity degree in
sensitive areas, or for military operations over battlefields.
In this context, bringing security guaranties — including
availability — to the network becomes essential.
Based on former studies (see Section I), the present one
relies on the use of monitoring nodes (or “cNodes”) to protect
a wireless sensor network again various denial of service
attacks. Actually, it focuses on the election process of those
control nodes. Our approach consists in taking energy into
account at this step, in order to obtain an even better load
balancing. We propose to designate the sensors for the cNode
position according to their residual energy, but we show that
several problems occur with deterministic election. Indeed
compromised nodes could see a flaw to exploit in order to take
over the cNode role and decrease the odds of being detected
by announcing high residual energy. We address this issue by
introducing a second role of surveillance: we choose “vNodes”
responsible for watching over the cNodes and for matching
their announced consumption against mathematical model. We
also recommend that every node in the cluster be monitored
by at least one cNode to prevent all the cNodes to be elected
inside the same spatial area of the cluster at each election
iteration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: first we
present a quick overview of related work in Section I. After
we introduce a new cNode selection method in Section II, we
describe and discuss the simulation of the algorithm that we
have done using ns-3 in Section III. Last Section summarizes
the main contributions of the paper and gives some directions
of future work.
I. RELATED WORK
For sensitive operations involving the deployment of a
wireless sensor network, all security aspects of the network
must be reviewed. WSN-addressed protocols to provide data
privacy [4] and authentication [5] have been subject to deep
research investigation, and led for example to the proposal
of mechanisms for secure data aggregation without persistent
cryptographic operations [6] or for authenticated broadcast
such as µTESLA [7]. But cryptography is of no use if the
network is down: in this paper we focused on resistance
against denial of service (DoS) attacks.
Indeed there are many existing attacks able to compromise
the good working of a wireless sensor network [8]. Several
mechanisms have been proposed to detect it and to provide
countermeasures [9], [10]. Many consist in the implementation
of trust based mechanisms [11], [12] with agents applying
set of rules [13] on traffic to attribute a trust value to each
of the nodes in the network. In particular, Lai and Chen
[14] proposed to elect control nodes to monitor the traffic in
clustered networks and to detect and react to denial of service
attacks. Clustered networks are partitioned into clusters via
algorithms such as LEACH [15]. One cluster head (CH) per
cluster is responsible for gathering data from its peers, for
aggregating and sending it to the base station. The CHs are
the only nodes to use long range (and expensive) transmissions
to reach the base station. Clustering enables to preserve energy
for the sensing nodes and offers an easier management of the
nodes. In our case, all nodes of a cluster can reach their cluster
head directly (1-hop transmission), as on Figure 1.
Figure 1. Clustered wireless sensor networks scheme
Control nodes are elected among the non-cluster head nodes
of a cluster. We will call them cNodes from now on. They
are responsible for listening to the traffic and detecting nodes
whose emitted traffic exceeds a given threshold value. These
abnormal behaviors are reported to the cluster head. On recep-
tion of reports from several distinct cNodes (to prevent false
denunciation from a compromised node), the CH virtually
excludes the suspicious node from the cluster. Although the
method is efficient for detecting rogue nodes, the authors
do not give details of the election mechanism to choose the
cNodes. Also, there is no mention in their study of renewing
the election in time, which causes the appointed cNodes to
endorse a heavier energy consumption on a long period.
In a first attempt to bring load balancing to this solution,
we propose in other papers [16], [17] to reiterate the election
periodically. Simulations show a better load repartition among
the cluster, but at this time our focus was not on designing an
energy efficient election process for the cNodes. This is the
purpose of the current study.
II. CNODES SELECTION MECHANISM
Using control nodes to watch over the network traffic allows
the detection of various types of denial of service attacks. This
is achieved with agents in the cNodes applying specific rules
on overheard traffic. Each rule is used to fight against one kind
of attack: jamming, tampering, black hole attacks, and so on
[13]. Due to limited size for this paper, we can not described in
details the attacks and the associated rules. We will only treat
one example in the rest of this study: flooding attacks. The
model of a flooding attack is the following: a malicious node
sends a high amount of data to prevent legitimate nodes from
communicating by saturating the medium, or by establishing
too many connections with the receiver node [18]. In wireless
sensor networks, it is also used to drain the energy of neighbor
nodes. cNodes are responsible for listening to the traffic of
their surrounding nodes: if a sensor is to generate more
traffic in the network than a predetermined threshold, it is
considered as potentially compromised and trying to flood the
network. A report is sent to the cluster head. On reception of
reports coming from multiple cNodes, the CH considers that
traffic from the suspicious node must no more be considered.
Information about distrust is passed on to normal nodes which
stop listening to the packets coming from the attacker. We
work under the following assumptions: firstly, the cluster head
is not a compromised node (the use of cNodes to detect a
malicious CH is described in [14], but it is not considered in
this paper). Secondly, we do not consider the case of several
malicious nodes cooperating with one another.
Electing the cNodes is not an easy task. In [17] we expose
and compare three ways to elect them:
• pseudo-random election by the base station;
• pseudo-random election by the cluster head;
• pseudo-random election by the nodes themselves.
We assumed that election should be random so that com-
promised nodes would not be aware of which node could
control the traffic. In that previous study however we do not
consider the remaining energy during the cNodes election. But
monitoring the traffic implies to keep listening for wireless
transmission without interruption. Hence cNodes will have a
greater energy consumption than normal nodes. Given that
preserving energy is an essential issue in the network, we
prefer to ensure load balancing rather than assuring a pseudo-
random election, and thus to consider the residual energy of
the nodes during the election. This choice also raises new
issues and makes us define a new role for the nodes in the
cluster.
A. Using vNodes to ensure a secured deterministic election
The issue with energy measurement is that no agent in the
network is able to measure the residual energy of a given node
N , but the node itself. The neighbor nodes of N may record
messages sent from N and compute a rough estimate, but as
they know neither the initial amount of energy of N (at the
network deployment) nor the energy N spent for listening,
estimates can not be used to obtain values precise enough so
as to reliably sort the nodes according to their residual energy.
So the only way to get the residual energy of a node is to
ask this node. The election algorithm we propose is described
as follows:
1) During first step, each node evaluates its residual energy
and sends the value to the cluster head;
2) Having received the residual energy of all nodes in
the cluster, the cluster head picks the n nodes with
the highest residual energy (where n is the desired
number of cNodes during each cycle) and returns them
a message to assign them the role of cNode.
It is a deterministic selection algorithm which eliminates
any random aspect from the process. The rule is simple:
nodes possessing the highest residual energy will be elected.
Given that the cNode role implies consuming more energy
(cNodes listen to surrounding communications most of the
time), rotation of the roles is theoretically assured. But the
deterministic aspect is also a flaw that may be exploited
by compromised nodes. This is a crucial issue: we can not
neglect compromised nodes as the whole cNodes mechanism
is deployed in the sole purpose to detect them!
More precisely, the problem may be stated as follows.
Compromised nodes will be interested in endorsing a cNode
role, as it enables them:
• to reduce the number of legitimate cNodes able to detect
them;
• to advertise the cluster head about “innocent” sensing
nodes to have them revoked.
When a pseudo-random election algorithm is applied, a com-
promised node (or even several ones) can be elected during a
cycle, but it will loose its role further in time, for later cycles.
Even with a self-election process (based on LEACH [15]
model for instance), compromised nodes can keep their cNode
role as long as they want, but they can not prevent other
(legitimate) nodes to elect themselves, too. With deterministic
election however, they can monopolize most of the available
cNode roles. They only have to announce the highest residual
energy value at the first step of the election to get assured
to win. If there are enough compromised nodes to occupy all
of the n available cNode roles, then they become virtually
immune to potential detection.
To prevent nodes from lying when announcing their residual
energy, we propose to assign a new role to some of the neigh-
bors of each cNode. Those nodes — we call them vNodes, as
for verification nodes — are responsible for the surveillance of
the monitoring nodes. Once the cNodes election is over, each
neighbor to a cNode decides with a given probability whether
it will be a vNode for this cNode or not. A given node can act
as a vNode for several cNode (in other words, it can survey
several neighbor cNode).
If this role consumes too much energy, it is not worth de-
ploying vNodes: we should rather use pseudo-random election
for the cNodes. So vNodes must not stay awake and listen
most of the time, as cNodes do. Instead they send, from time
to time, requests to the cNode they watch over, asking it for
its residual energy. They wait for the answer, and keep the
value in memory.
Once they have gathered enough data, vNodes try to cor-
relate the theoretical model of consumption of the cNode
they survey and its announced consumption, deduced from
broadcast messages (during elections) and answers to requests
from vNodes. Four distinct cases may occur:
1) The announced consumption does not correlate (at all)
with the theoretical model: there is a high probability
the node is compromised and seeks to take over cNode
role. It is reported to the cluster head;
2) The announced consumption correlates exactly with the
theoretical model: the node is probably a compromised
node trying to get elected while escaping to detection
(in other words, the rogue cNode adapts its behavior
regarding to the previous point). It is easy to detect the
subterfuge as values received from the rogue node and
the ones computed by the vNodes are exactly the same.
It is reported to the cluster head;
3) The announced consumption correlates roughly with
the theoretical model, but does not evolve in the same
way (regarding to the model) than the real consumption
locally observed by the vNodes (local (in time) evolution
of the announced consumption does not “stick” to the
one of the surrounding vNodes, which should roughly
rise or decrease during the same periods). The node is
probably compromised, trying to escape detection by
decreasing its announced energy with random values.
It is reported to the CH;
4) The announced consumption correlates roughly with
theoretical model, and evolves in the same way as
the traffic observed by vNodes. Whether the node is
compromised or not, it has a normal behavior, and is
allowed to act as a cNode.
If a given vNode is in fact a malicious node, it could lie about
integrity of the cNode it watches. To prevent that, the cluster
head must receive multiple reports (their number exceeding a
predetermined threshold) from distinct vNodes before actually
considering a cNode as compromised. To some extent, this
also makes the scheme resilient to errors from the vNodes.
In that way, nodes are allowed to act as cNodes only if they
announce plausible amounts of residual energy. Assuming that
this role consumes more energy than sensing only, the nodes
elected as cNodes will sooner or later see their residual energy
drop below the reserve of normal sensing nodes, which implies
that they will not get re-elected at the next election. Note that
the cases 2 and 3 make a compromised node decrement its
announced energy as the time goes by. Even if inconsistency
may be noticed and the compromise detected, this simple
behavior ensures that the rogue node will stop to get elected
at one point in the time.
Thus, the interest of vNodes can be summarized as follows:
a compromised node can not ensure the takeover of the cNode
role at each cycle without cheating when announcing residual
energy, and hence being detected by the vNodes. Detecting
rogue cNodes, or forcing them to give up their role for later
cycles, are the two purposes of the vNodes. The vNode role
does not prevent a node to process to its normal sensing
activity (requests to cNodes must not occur often, otherwise
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Figure 2. State machine of the (non-CH) nodes
it will drain too much power from the vNodes). The state
machine of the nodes is presented in Figure 2.
B. Cluster coverage in case of heterogeneous activity
Deterministic election of the cNodes does not only introduce
a flaw that compromised nodes could try to exploit. There is
a second problem, independent from the nodes behavior, that
could prevent the detection of compromised nodes. If a region
of the network happens to produce more traffic activity than
the other parts of the network, the energy of its nodes will be
drawn faster. In consequence, none of the n nodes with the
highest residual energy (n being the desired number of cNodes
during each cycle) will be located inside this region, and some
nodes may not be covered for surveillance as long as traffic
do not fade, possibly for all cycles. Figure 3 illustrates this
problem.
cNodes' range
does not cover
all nodes in cluster
cNodes
CH
nodes with low
residual energy
area with
high activity
cluster
Figure 3. Illustrative scheme: cNodes are elected inside the area with less
activity (thus with more residual energy) and do not cover nodes from the
opposite side of the network.
To address this issue we need to ensure that every node in
the network is covered by at least one cNode. So the election
process we presented in II-A needs to be modified. The correct
version is as follows:
1) During first step, each node evaluates its residual energy
and broadcasts the value;
2) The cluster head listens to all values. Other nodes also
register all messages they hear into memory;
3) All nodes send to the CH the list of their 1-hop neigh-
bors1;
4) The CH picks the n nodes among those with the highest
residual energy, such that the n nodes cover all other
nodes in range2. If needed, it selects some additional
1We do not deal with the case of compromised nodes cheating at this step
of the process. Indeed they could announce extra virtual neighbors to try to
escape from coverage.
2The details of the algorithm executed by the cluster head at this step are
not given in this study.
nodes to cover all the cluster;
5) The CH returns to selected nodes a message to assign
them the role of cNode.
Note that some clustering algorithms (such as HEED [19]
for example) provide other election mechanisms (for cluster
heads, but that can also be used for selecting cNodes) based on
residual energy. We do not want to use it because energy only
takes part in the process as a factor for probability that the
nodes declare themselves elected. Instead we prefer nodes to
broadcast their residual energy in order to enable surveillance
by the vNodes.
C. Observations
cNodes apply a very basic trust based scheme to the cluster:
when a sensor node breaks a rule, for example by exceeding
a given threshold for transmitted packets, it is considered as
untrustworthy. There are many other trust based schemes in
literature, most of them more advanced than this one (see
Section I). The cNodes could implement several other trust
mechanisms (by lowering a score on bad behaviour for each
node for instance). As more complex mechanism would create
additional overhead, we prefer to limit to this simple method
in this study.
III. SELECTION IN PRACTICE: RESULTS FROM SIMULATION
We have undertaken simulation of our proposal regarding
the energy consumption in order to compare it with the
previous model (using pseudo-random election for cNodes).
We used ns-3 software to proceed.
In the new proposal, the vNodes are to model the theoretical
consumption of the cNodes they watch over. We have chosen
to use Rakhmatov and Vrudhula’s diffusion model [20] to
compute the consumption. This choice was driven by several
reasons:
• it provides a pretty accurate approximation of real con-
sumption, taking into account chemical processes internal
to the battery such as rate capacity effect and recovery
effect;
• it is one of the models already implemented in ns-3.
So in our case it is an absolutely perfect theoretical
model. It remains “theoretical” as vNodes use this model
to compute the expected behaviour of cNodes according
to the few packets they sometimes hear. Meanwhile, real
cNodes consumption computed by ns-3 core takes into
account every packet actually sent or received by cNodes,
also including packets that vNodes can not hear (because
of distance or sleep schedule). So the values computed
by vNodes and ns-3 core will not always be the same,
which allows us to use the model.
Rakhmatov and Vrudhula’s diffusion model refers to the
chemical reaction happening inside the battery electrolyte, and
is summarized by equation (1).
σ(t) =
∫ t
0
i(τ) dτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l(t)
+
u(t)︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ t
0
i(τ)
(
2
∞∑
m=1
exp−β
2m2(t−r)
)
dτ
(1)
where:
• σ(t) is the apparent charge lost from the battery at t;
• l(t) is the charge lost to the load (“useful” charge);
• u(t) is the unavailable charge (“lost in battery” charge);
• i(t) is the current at t;
• β =
pi
√
D
w
, where D is the diffusion constant and w the
full width of the electrolyte.
In practice, computing the first ten terms of the sum provides a
good approximation (this is also the default behavior of ns-3,
by the way).
We launched several simulation instances and chose to focus
on the energy consumption and load balancing in the cluster.
To obtain data about detection rate or false positive values of
the cNodes scheme, the reader is redirected to our previous
work [16], [17]. When we implemented our solution, we set
the parameters of the simulation as detailed in Table I.
Table I
PARAMETERS USED FOR SIMULATIONS
Parameter Value
Number of nodes 30 (plus 1 CH)
Number of cNodes 4
Probability for vNodes selection 33 %
Delay between consecutive elections 1 minute
Simulation length 30 minutes
Cluster shape Squared box
Cluster length Diagonal is 2×50 meters
Transmission range 50 meters
Location of the nodes CH: center; others: random
Mobility of the nodes Null
Average data sent by normal nodes 1024 bytes every 3 seconds
Data sent by vNodes (per target cNode) 1024 bytes every 5 seconds
We obtained the residual energy values for each node at each
minute of the simulation. From this data we draw the average
residual energy of the nodes (excluding cluster head) as well as
the standard deviation. Average residual energy per minute in
the batteries of the nodes is displayed on Figure 4. Increasing
values at t = 11 minutes and t = 15 minutes with the use
of the proposed solution traduce the recovery effect of the
batteries. As expected, our proposal causes an increased global
energy consumption. This is due, of course, to the new vNode
role. vNodes have to wake up periodically to send requests to
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Figure 4. Average residual energy of the nodes (excluding cluster head)
neighbor cNodes and to wait for an answer: this is energy-
consuming. The estimated overhead for our solution appears
on Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Estimated number of generated packets during the simulation
Standard deviation of residual energy value in the nodes
at each minute of the simulation is presented on Figure 6.
During the first minutes of simulation, our solution creates a
higher disproportion in load balancing due to the introduction
of vNodes (there are more nodes assuming demanding func-
tions). But after the seven first minutes or so, the standard
deviation with our method falls below the standard deviation
of previous method. This is the consequence of a better load
repartition over the nodes with our solution. The difference
between standard deviation with and without our simulation
may look small: this is due to the model of the simulation
we implemented. Given that we have a good pseudo-random
numbers generator, when the number of elections get high,
all nodes will roughly assume cNode role the same number
of times in simulation not using our solution. As sensing
nodes all have the same activity, a correct repartition of the
cNode roles over the time leads to a good energy balance.
But in a situation where sensing nodes have different activity
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Figure 6. Standard deviation for residual energy of the nodes
levels — for instance, if there is an area in the cluster when
measured events occur much more often than in the other parts
of the cluster — the consumption would not be equilibrated
between all the nodes with the previous method; whereas our
solution would deal well with this case, since cNodes are
elected according to residual energy. Thus simulations show
that the use of vNodes leads to a higher energy consumption,
but electing cNodes on residual energy provides a better load
repartition in the cluster.
CONCLUSION
cNodes are used in clustered wireless sensor networks to
monitor traffic of the nodes and to detect denial of service
attacks (e.g. flooding, black hole attacks). In this paper, we
have proposed a new method to dynamically elect those cN-
odes, based on their residual energy. The aim of the proposed
selection algorithm is to provide a better load balancing in the
cluster.
We have addressed several issues related with the use of a
deterministic selection. Compromised nodes trying to system-
atically take over the cNode role are forced to abandon it for
later cycle, or get detected, by vNodes. The vNode role is a
new role we introduced to survey the cNodes by matching their
announced energy consumption with a theoretical model. The
issue of areas of the cluster uncovered by cNodes, depending
of the activity in the cluster, is addressed by enforcing covering
of the whole cluster: the cluster head is to designate additional
cNodes if needed. Working with clusters ensures a good
scalability of the solution. It is also flexible, as cNodes can
endorse various trust-based model, and monitoring rules can
be set to fight against several types of denial of service attacks.
And the use of vNodes is resilient to a small percentage of
compromised vNodes (depending on parameters set by user).
The results we have obtained through simulations show
that even though using our simulation causes a higher global
consumption of energy in the cluster, it provides a better load
repartition between sensors.
Future works include improvements of our solution by
adding monitoring of the cluster head, as well as modeling
a cluster with areas of different activity levels. Also we
would especially like to study the impact of the percentage
of designated vNodes on global energy consumption.
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